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cock." Compare rather Plato, Phaedo 76 E. καὶ εί μὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲ τάδε with the context. Battledore and shuttlecock would more aptly illustrate stichomythia than this serious interdependence of arguments.

At xxiii. 46 "quod matris somnium immanis fili crudelitas comprobavit" I miss a note on the rhythm, which is conscious. Cicero is patterning his style here on the sentence which he praises in *Orator* 63 "patris dictum sapiens temeritas filii comprobavit." In i. 53 "singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles," what possible reason can there be for taking this as "characteristic of the encyclopedic Posidonius" rather than as Cicero's own opinion? In i. 51. 115 "animus quia vixit ab omni aeternitate," etc. I fear that Professor Pease has again yielded to the Posidonius obsession. We know that Plato was acquainted with *Phaedrus* 247–49 and presumably with *Meno* 81 B. No more is needed. Again in 52. 118 "aut adfingit aut mutat aut detrahit" he has, if I may say so, been bluffed by Schmekel and the Posidonius legend into citing Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 117 δαίρεσιν . . . άλλοίωσιν . . . σύγχυσιν. If Cicero required authority he need not have looked farther than Lucretius ii. 769–70.

materies ubi permixta est illius et ordo principiis mutatus et addita demptaque quaedam

which he of course knew.

These and other minor differences of opinion do not of course in the least impair the value of this excellent edition which is one of the most useful and learned pieces of work that any American scholar has to his credit.

PAUL SHOREY

Der junge Platon. By Ernst Horneffer. Part I. Sokrates und die Apologie. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1922.

Professor Horneffer believes that the most significant parts of a philosopher's life and writings are those that reveal the formation of his ideas and the shaping of his opinions. He proposes to undertake a fresh study of the youth of Plato from this point of view. The recent works of Pohlenz and von Arnim, and what he aptly characterizes as "Wilamowitz' Stimmungsentwicklung Platons," have, he thinks, not only not solved, they have not even stated the problem. His own solution is reserved for a later book. But to judge by the introduction to the present volume, his leading idea is that the religiosity of Plato and Socrates is a sincere resistance to the skeptical "enlightenment" of the Sophistic age and not merely the respectful acquiescence in traditional religion which is all that scholars who are themselves skeptics have seen in it.

This prepares the way for the main thesis of the book which is that the Delphic oracle which pronounced Socrates the wisest was genuine, was

taken seriously by Socrates, and did actually determine his mission as he The objection that the oracle which is supposed describes it in the Apology. to have shaped Socrates' life presupposes that he is already a well-known personage he meets by a distinction. The mission of gadfly to somnolent Athens Socrates undertook in consequence of the oracle at the age of fifty. Before that he was a disciple of the physicist Archelaos, well known to an inner circle but not the Socrates who examined men in the market place on the state of their souls. It is this earlier Socrates that Aristophanes' Clouds portrays, in caricature to be sure, but on a basis of truth without which the comedy could have had no meaning. This is interesting and plausible enough. But why will Professor Horneffer spoil it by trying to prove too much? In Aristophanes' words ὅτι βρενθύει τ'ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς he sees evidence that this earlier Socrates strode proudly through the streets and did not stop to buttonhole his fellow-citizens in democratic fashion for the good of their souls.

The Apology, then, is a faithful report of Socrates' speech and demeanor at his trial. Plato, the artist, dealt freely even in the earliest dialogues with Socrates' ideas and frequently made him the mouthpiece of his own. But in the direct personal portrayal of the man in the crisis of his life he was faithful to fact. This, Horneffer argues, is a priori probable, and there is no evidence to support the various technical and legal objections that have been raised to the conduct of the trial as described by Plato.

My only criticism of all this is that which I would oppose to any attempt to reconstruct the historical Socrates out of Plato and Xenophon. How do you know? Professor Horneffer says that Socrates was greater than his disciples represented him. That is true only in the sense that an inspiring personality is always greater than any literary portrait. But the Platonic Socrates is evidently too good to be true. If we include the intellect, he is the highest ideal of man that the human mind has ever conceived. That ideal is the creation of Plato, and we have no evidence to reconstruct the reality except our feeling that it must have been very wonderful to inspire Plato to this result.

Professor Horneffer cites only recent German publications. There is no allusion to any English, French, or American work. That is a pity, and I hope that it is not intentional. We philologians, whatever our political background, cannot afford to ignore one another in a world of science and materialism that is inclined to ignore us altogether. Even the well-organized philology of Germany will lose by isolation. Professor Horneffer has apparently not heard of Burnet's and Taylor's view of the character of Socrates and the bearing of Aristophanes' Clouds upon it. He does not know Faguet's Pour qu'on lise Platon, which anticipates and qualifies his idea of Plato's attitude toward traditional religion. He is unaware that Gomperz' epigram about the union of warm heart and cold head in Socrates comes from Emerson's essay on Plato. He discusses the legal aspects of the Apology

with no reference to Professor Bonner's illuminating paper on the subject.¹ He has not observed that his criticism of Gomperz' denial of protreptic purpose to the "real" Socrates was anticipated long ago in this journal.²

Not the least interesting portion of the book is the appendix on Das delphische Orakel als ethischer Preisrichter, by Professor Rudolf Herzog. This is intended to support Horneffer's contention that the oracle about Socrates is genuine. Professor Herzog studies in detail the edifying anecdotes of similar pronouncements by the oracle of Delphi in answer to the typical questions: who is the most pious man? who is the wisest man? who is the happiest man? I cannot take space to analyze this little treatise which is a model of compact and clear exposition. But anyone who is interested in the history of the rustica Phidyle idea, the Solon-Croesus story, or the legend of the seven wise men will do well to consult it. The edifying anecdotes here collected of course do not prove the reality of the pronouncement about Socrates. They only show that to Greek feeling there was nothing strange or unreasonable in Chaerophon's putting such a question to the oracle.

PAUL SHOREY

Aus Goethe's Griechischer Gedankenwelt. Von Karl Bapp (Das Erbe der Alten, Zweite Reihe VI). Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921.

This little volume is intended as a supplement to Ernst Maass's Goethe und die Antike. It may serve the same purpose in relation to William Jacob Keller's "Goethe's Estimate of the Greek and Latin Writers," (bulletin of the University of Wisconsin,) which Professor Bapp evidently does not know. Sixty out of the ninety-nine pages of this volume are occupied with a study of Goethe and Heraclitus, who is not mentioned in Keller, and only glanced at by Maass. Bapp admits, however, that his profuse quotations from Goethe are proofs of Wesensverwandtschaft rather than of direct literary imitation. The analogues and parallels which he has collected will be very interesting to the general student of literature and philosophy, and of the history of ideas. The philologian will have some reserves. Goethe's acquaintance with Schleiermacher's edition of the fragments of Heraclitus seems to date from 1806. Before that he of course could pick up isolated quotations in his general reading in the history of philosophy and in the classics. Professor Bapp, however, who is sure that Heraclitus was a "monist," discovers Heraclitean influence and analogies, not only in any and every expression by Goethe of the ideas of flux, relativity, the identity

^{1&}quot;The Legal Setting of Plato's Apology," Classical Philology, III (1908), 169 ff.

 $^{^2 \, \}mathrm{Shorey}, \, \mathrm{review} \, \, \mathrm{of} \, \, \mathrm{Gomperz'} \, \, \mathrm{``Greek \, Thinkers,''} \, \, \mathit{Classical \, Philology}, \, \, \mathrm{I} \, \, (1906), \, \, 295 \, \mathrm{f}.$